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THE  
AWAKENING  
OF THE  
GERMAN PEOPLE

BY  
OTFRIED NIPPOLD

PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BERNE  
AUTHOR OF "DER DEUTSCHE CHAUVINISMUS," ETC.

*Translated by*  
ALEXANDER GRAY

NEW YORK  
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## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

PROFESSOR OTFRIED NIPPOLD, the author of this pamphlet, was born in 1864, the son of a professor at the University of Jena. In the course of a varied life, he has held office under the Ministry of Justice in the Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, he has taught International and Commercial Law at Tokio, and he has had experience of the diplomatic service under the German Foreign Office, being resident for some time in London. In more recent years he has devoted himself to the academic life, teaching International Law in the University of Berne.

Professor Nippold is a writer of great eminence and authority on the subject with which his name is connected. His first important work, *Der Völkerrechtliche Vertrag*, appeared as long ago as 1894; his greatest work in recent years has centred round the Second Hague Conference.

In Great Britain, however, Professor Nippold is, no doubt, most widely known as the author of *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, a book which was published at Stuttgart in 1913. Apart from a few pages of commentary, this volume consists almost exclusively of extracts from the German Press, reports of meetings of various organisations, and selections from chauvinistic addresses. The work is an invaluable guide to the tendencies in Germany before the war, and it has

gradually been recognised as one of the most illuminating volumes on the genesis of the present conflict.

It may be observed that *Der Deutsche Chauvinismus*, which has recently been re-published in Berne, was originally one of the publications of the Union for Promoting International Understanding, an organisation which Professor Nippold was largely instrumental in founding.

## PREFACE

**T**O all who desire that a truly lasting peace should be granted to the world after this war, it is a matter of importance to observe the changes in the mentality of the German people, and to examine the attitude of the German Government with a view to appraising its sincerity regarding the conditions of the future peace. For this reason I venture to believe that the discussion contained in the following pages may be read with advantage in England also.

This pamphlet was written some months ago. The situation has, however, in no way changed in the interval. The German mentality is still the same. The German Government also still continues to play a double game: pacifist towards the outer world, while remaining militaristic within. Michaelis followed Bethmann-Hollweg; Hertling followed Michaelis. But the system has remained the same, and without compulsion it will always remain the same.

Even if there existed in Germany a government which was sincerely inspired with good intentions (which so far is not the case), matters would be in no way advanced, for in Germany it is not the Government but the military party that governs; behind the Chancellor stand the generals. The people has no voice, and indeed it has no desire to make its voice

seriously heard; it is content if it can but shout "Hurrah!" with Hindenburg.

The German Revolution is still remote. The German people has not yet awakened. And the German Parliament is the personification of modesty; it believes everything that the Government considers it desirable that it should believe. Thus, in the event of their desiring to attain a really pacifist peace, the German Government can rely for support neither on the people nor on Parliament; they have only the generals behind them.

And for this reason a lasting peace, which does not rest on a militaristic point of view, is not at the present moment possible with the German Government. There will be no lasting peace in the world, so long as militarism reigns in Germany. Not until the German people has awakened,—by pressure from within or from without,—will this peace come.

OTFRIED NIPPOLD.

THUN, *February*, 1918.

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GERMAN PEOPLE**





# THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

## I

**B**EFORE the outbreak of the present war it can scarcely be said that any real attempt had been made to give an account of the powerful force which suggestions are capable of exercising even in the life of nations, and particularly in this nation. At that time only a few writers had devoted their attention to "Mass-suggestions."\* Thus it happened that people had not become aware, or at any rate wide circles of them were still ignorant, of the way in which the war-makers in Germany had systematically been at work in recent years to influence the soul of the German people by the instrumentality of certain catch-words. In my book on *German Chauvinism* which appeared in 1913 I undertook the task of producing documentary evidence of this systematic activity on the

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\* From the period before the war it is necessary to refer here only to Le Bon, *The Crowd*, and Christensen, *Politics and Mass Morality*, as well as to the lecture on *The Significance of Suggestion in the Life of the Nations*, which the well-known psychologist Adolf Friedländer delivered at Nuremberg in 1913, at the Congress of the Union for Promoting International Understanding. From the period of the war I would mention Robert Gaupp, *Delusion and Error in the Life of the Nations*, as well as Nicolai's recent book, *The Biology of War*.

part of those forces which in Germany were exerting themselves in the direction of a war. I used the term "Chauvinists" comprehensively to include all these classes, not merely the military party who longed for war in itself, but also the Pan-German politicians and imperialists who for political or other reasons chose to represent it as desirable and inevitable. I further showed the catch-words of which use was made in these circles to make the German people, in itself peace-loving, "mellow" for war. In this undertaking the "encirclement" inevitably played a part from the outset, as did also the "French thirst for revenge," the "envy of the English" and the alleged danger of "Panslavism." All these had to do their part in the task of representing to the German people that war was in the first place inevitable. The war-intriguers, however, did not stop at this stage. In recent years they advanced to the theory of the preventive war and advocated quite openly a war of aggression. In justification of such a war they in no way restricted themselves, however, to pointing out the necessity of choosing the right moment for a war, but they represented even an aggressive war as being simply in the interests of an "active" German policy and of an extension of German power. Thus these war-intriguers had in the end really arrived at the point of recommending to the German people a predatory war, without the public opinion of Germany revolting against the suggestion; indeed, they were able to put forward these views amid the general approval of the multitude and more particularly of the Press.

The German people, unfortunately, was not aware

of the growing danger that menaced its soul. The number of those who fell within the spell of these suggestions was constantly increasing. In 1913, in my *German Chauvinism*, I was obliged to confirm the fact that even then very extensive classes of the German people believed in these catch-words. Even if before the war the number of the real and conscious Imperialists in Germany was limited, scarcely extending to the circle of those imbued with Pan-German sentiments, it still remains a fact that the great majority of the German people had nevertheless fallen under the spell of the catch-words that were scattered abroad, in this sense that they began to desire that "the bomb might at last explode if, as they say, war is inevitable." As a result of the year-long incitement to war, the German people had in fact been made "mellow," so mellow that in the end even men who were in themselves peace-loving directly longed for the dreaded war. Before the war it was only a relatively small section of the population, drawn from eminent men of intellect, from democrats belonging to the civil parties and social democrats, who had remained deaf to the suggestions of the war-intriguers.

It was under these circumstances that the year 1914 approached. Here I pass over all the portents which some months beforehand could not have failed to intimate to the careful observer the approach of the catastrophe. These indications would in themselves form an interesting chapter, with which I may perhaps deal on another occasion. In consequence of the machinations of the war-intriguers the German people's nervousness, sensitiveness and responsiveness to sugges-

tion had gradually reached an abnormal development. As a result the circle of these intriguers felt that they were near their goal. Writing in *März* of July 18th, 1914, I believed that I might still warn the German Government against these intrigues\* :—"How is it possible in authoritative circles to hope, when the decisive hour arrives, to be able to master the evil, when it is continually being allowed to grow greater, and nothing is done at the right time to seize the appropriate counter-measures? What may not be an immediate danger to-day may become so overnight." A few days later the decisive hour had arrived. The German Government not only failed to master the evil, but capitulated to it.

Nevertheless they did not venture to tell the truth to the German people, no matter how "mellow" it had gradually been made. The truth would not have seized the people in the way considered necessary in a war. Thus a new catch-word was added to those used in pursuing mass-suggestions before the war, that, namely, of the "ruthless attack" and of the "war of defence forced upon us." For the unprejudiced, objective onlooker it cannot be said to be very ingeniously devised; for, indeed, this catch-word, when the whole situation is considered, was in reality only devised for political babes. Only the poor German people had already in fact been brought so far, that it blindly believed everything, and thus it even believed in a

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\* Apart from this article on "Love of War in Germany," I had repeatedly endeavoured to utter a warning, more particularly in the *Deutsche Revue*. I would refer to my article in that journal, entitled "Where is the Danger for the Peace of Europe?" dated June, 1913, and "Political Dilettantism in Europe," dated January, 1914.

“ruthless attack.” The German people, down to the last man, believed it as gospel truth. If before the outbreak of war a section of the population had not yet fallen within the spell of these catch-words, the position in this respect was now at once altered. And thus Militarism and Pan-Germanism had gained the upper hand in Germany, not merely over the people but over the Government as well.

Militarism now held unrestricted sway, and beside it a Nationalism in which imperialistic tendencies now manifested themselves in a more unveiled form than heretofore. In its issue of September 19th, 1916, the Berlin Conservative paper, *Die Post*, could quite correctly write with reference to my controversy with von Sybel in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* that imperialistic efforts in Germany were before the war restricted to a narrow circle, and were indeed from time to time officially repudiated. An Imperialism could, however, only operate in a really expansive manner when it penetrated into the great mass of the people and had permanently established itself there; every individual must have accepted imperialistic ideas in such a strong measure in his own circle of thoughts, that the imperialistic direction of his actions was in fact no longer present to his consciousness. It was only during the war, *Die Post* continued, that the German people had found the soil on which the imperialistic idea could take root and bring forth fruit. This was indeed the case. On the outbreak of war the whole German people did in fact fall under the spell of the suggestions of the war-makers.

And since then the German people has slumbered

and dreamed a fair dream. It dreams of victories and of glory and of the respect which it has instilled into the whole world by its deeds of heroism and by its spirit of sacrifice; it dreams of the position of power which the future Germany will enjoy in the circle of the nations, and it dreams of peace. It continues to dream and it does not see and cannot see the crude reality. For the war-makers carefully seek to guard it against an awakening from its fair dream. Every day the newspapers tell the German people of new victories. The peace that is to come will thus be based on a German victory; not in vain will the sacrifices have been made. The truth is jealously kept from them, lest they awake. Nothing is allowed to pass the German frontier that could disturb the fair dream. And within Germany nothing is written or spoken that could rob the population of this illusion. Thus to-day the German people has no longer any knowledge of how it was incited into this war. Everything that took place before the war is forgotten. The German people is innocent of this war. It did not want it; it did not provoke it; it is merely defending itself and safeguarding its national existence. And as it is innocent of the outbreak of war, so also it is innocent of the continuation of the war. It has conquered and is ready for peace. What more can one ask? It cannot realise that there can be people who attribute to Germany itself the guilt of the war, and who also despite everything hold it responsible for the continuance of the war. That can only be done by the enemies of the German people, that is to say, the wicked Englishmen and Frenchmen, Russians and Japanese, and, unfortu-

nately, many neutrals as well. Yes, indeed, the whole world seems to-day to have risen against Germany. They are surrounded by enemies. The enemies are everywhere—but not in their own land, not there where the dreaming German people continues to be carefully guarded against awakening.

What will this awakening reveal to the German people? What will the crude reality look like, when the dream is at an end? The thought is a bitter one. Every dream must come to an end some day; from every sleep there must be an awakening. And then the reality is seen. Then the German people will see that the rest of the world passes a different judgment on the question of the responsibility for the war from that current in Germany on the basis of the German official accounts. It will then recognise that while, no doubt, the German armies have often been victorious, they have not always been so, that the other side also has gained many a victory, that there was a battle on the Marne which completely frustrated the German plan of campaign, and that while it is certainly possible to dream of a German victory, such a victory cannot be experienced. It will recognise that even if Germany may perhaps be unconquerable it nevertheless cannot conquer, a fact which for an aggressor is necessarily a sorry business and cannot but destroy all dreams of victory. And further, what on awakening will be the outlook as regards their other dreams of glory and respect and honour? Has the German conduct of the war in fact been such as to increase the glory of the German name? Has it not rather been placed in the service of terror, branding the German

name for centuries to come, for the sake of momentary petty advantages? Have not the German army leaders, in agreement with the German Government, violated Belgian neutrality and often enough ridden roughshod over international law on many other occasions as well? And is it not the fact that German scholarship has declared its solidarity with all these actions, and has thus robbed itself of the glory which it enjoyed throughout the whole world? And has not the German Press done its utmost to feed the flame of universal hatred enkindled by these things—hatred, of course, against other nations who are innocent of all these matters, not hatred against the enemy who sits in their own land, working on the soul of their own people?\*

Thus, on awakening, the German people will really see itself confronted by a world of enemies, and it will be constrained to recognise that for many years to come it has gained, not glory and honour, but hatred and contempt. Yes, the thought of this awakening of the German people is bitter in the extreme! It cannot but wring one's very heart to think of this brave people and of the millions it has sacrificed in life and wealth, and then to picture the awakening of this people from its dream!

Now that their plan has failed and a German victory

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\* In No. 944 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Professor Förster rightly observes: "May the German people soon realise that the greatest enemies of a truly enduring peace sit in their own midst." I have already expressed myself in the same sense in *Wissen und Leben* of August 15th, 1916. It is not the French and the English who are in truth the enemies of the German people, but those who have brought the soul of the German people into the position, in which we see it to-day.



can no longer be expected, it can easily be understood that the authors of the catastrophe fear this awakening and seek to postpone it more and more—to postpone it, for after all they cannot completely prevent it. But postponement, that at least is possible—and then: *Après nous le déluge!* What must come, must come. Against such a contingency it is necessary to put on the armour of fatalism.

But is it then really possible to postpone it? Has not a portion at least of the German people already recognised the true position? There is no absence of isolated indications that daylight is beginning to dawn on the German people. The attitude assumed by the socialist community of labour has shown that among the labouring classes progress is being made towards a recognition of the situation. Moreover, even among the German intellectuals voices are beginning to be raised which appear to indicate a gradual awakening in these circles also. Indeed, I would go further than this. There have been a few Germans—and I do not hesitate to describe these men as the *best* men of Germany—who have from the beginning kept themselves immune against the machinations of the makers of war; who stood above the machine, who recognised the truth and the need of their people and who have yearned with their whole heart for its awakening. All honour to these Germans! On them in the first place depend the hopes for the future of the German people, which assuredly no one would hate, if it would confess its guilt and return to reason. Fortunately we in Switzerland have also had an opportunity of hearing such voices. What Prince Alexander zu

Hohenlohe and Professor Förster have written in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* proves that, despite all mass-suggestions, there have still been Germans who have recognised the truth—upright men, against whom the psychosis of war was powerless, men also who have dared to speak the truth.

Thus indications do in fact exist which point to a gradual awakening. The revolution in the German national spirit, the change in German mentality, is already in progress. At the same time it would be a mistake to overestimate the significance for the *present* hour of these signs of what is to come. In No. 1161 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* I have already uttered a warning against such an overestimation of these symptoms. It is indeed only an extremely petty fraction that has so far really awakened. To-day the great mass of the German people is still slumbering. Many, very many no doubt, desire a new orientation, a democratisation of Germany; to this point I shall presently return in more detail. But they have not yet recognised the truth, that is to say, the fact that the German people has been, and to-day is still being, misled. How indeed should they be expected to do so, when the truth is not allowed to penetrate to them? To-day then it is only possible to say that truth is certainly on the march, that the anxious hour of the awakening draws near, but that it has not yet arrived.

In addition to the symptoms which I have here cited, and which indicate an approaching awakening of the German people, it is also possible to detect indirect symptoms which are to be interpreted in the same sense. In this class I would above all include the vio-

lent energy recently developed by the Pan-Germans. Not a day is allowed to pass in which they do not hold popular assemblies. Vast newspaper undertakings are founded with an enormous capital behind them, with the object of influencing the German people in a Pan-German sense. All this points to the fact that the Pan-Germans are nervous about their supremacy and that they mean to arm themselves against the hour of the German people's awakening.

What then is it, we may ask, that chiefly prevents the awakening of the German people?

In the forefront we must without doubt place the fact that those classes which are to-day dominant in Germany still unfortunately believe that they may be able, not merely to postpone the awakening of the German people, but perhaps even to prevent it altogether. They do not yet appear to realise, or else they do not wish to realise, that by so doing they are at the same time postponing and preventing peace. And yet this is the case. All the protestations of the German Government's desire for peace cannot get over this fact. If to-day the question is asked: "What is the real obstacle to the conclusion of peace?" the only possible answer is that it is the attitude of the German Government and the mentality of the German people induced by this attitude. On this latter point I need say nothing further here; we have already seen that to-day the German people is still asleep. Its awakening would certainly bring peace, but it is just this awakening that the German governmental circles fear and seek to prevent. What, however, is the position with regard to the German Government?

If the man, who so far has been Chancellor,\* did not himself on the outbreak of war invent the catchword about the "ruthless attack," he was at any rate the first to give it currency. In the eyes of the world at least, he was regarded as the representative of the system of government which had undertaken the task of misleading public opinion at home and abroad by seeking to transfer to others its own load of guilt. And throughout the whole duration of the war he had firmly adhered to this legend. In this way therefore he constantly made renewed attempts to mislead the public opinion of the German people, and beyond it the opinion of neutral foreign countries as well. This, however, is precisely what was once described in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* as the *moral obstacle to the conclusion of peace*.† It was there rightly explained that it was futile to speak of Germany's readiness for peace, so long as people in Germany were unwilling to draw the necessary conclusions from this fact, but on the contrary continued in a spirit of partiality to ascribe the guilt of the war to their enemies and to represent the war situation as if they had already conquered. So long as the Chancellor clings to these fictions, so long as he cannot make up his mind to pay honour to truth and abandon the moral struggle, matters will not advance as far as peace negotiations. The obstacle to the conclusion of peace lies nowhere

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\* The above was written *before* the last crisis in Germany. As, however, it is still in point, I have, in revising these observations, left them in essential matters unaltered, and have only added in the footnotes a few supplementary observations with regard to events which have since supervened.

† Compare No. 664 of April 27th, 1916, and No. 1945 of December 3rd, 1916.

else than in the German Chancellor. When we reflect on all that is at stake, that the war may yet last for years and may still cost millions of human lives, then we should indeed imagine that such a reflection might very well have induced a conscientious Government to a change in their policy. But there is, in fact, in Germany a lack of what "Europaeus" of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has aptly described as "civil courage." They could not prevail upon themselves to place the well-being of the German people and of the rest of the world above the interests of a clique.

The events of recent months have in fact fully confirmed the accuracy of the view just expounded. The German offer of peace which was made in December, 1916, once more asserted that Germany had been attacked, and sought to create the impression that Germany had been victorious. The answer of the Entente described the German peace proposal as "illusory" and they observed, with regard to the statements of the German Government, that they are bound to protest against the two material assertions in the note, "the one professing to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of the war, and the other proclaiming the victory of the Central powers. The Allies cannot admit a claim which is thus untrue in each particular, and is sufficient alone to render sterile all attempt at negotiations." To anyone who places himself in the position of the Allies, this answer will in no way appear incomprehensible. The Entente has got to conclude with the German Government a "paper treaty," on which the future of Europe will have to rest. For this

the primary necessity is confidence. Now the German Chancellor, with whom it would have had to deal in the matter, had not only described the treaty of neutrality as a "scrap of paper" when he allowed the violation of Belgian neutrality, but even at the very moment when he held out the hand of peace he had repeated the assertion that Germany had been attacked. Moreover to the mien of the innocent he had added the gesture of the conqueror. Assuming the position of the Allies, need it occasion any surprise that their governments felt no confidence in *this* German Government, and were unwilling to negotiate with it?

Truth is the basis of all confidence. This is a fact which in the future also it will be impossible to circumvent. The recognition of this fact can be concealed only from those governments who fail to have regard to the imponderabilia in political life and who therefore underestimate the moral factors in the life of the nations—governments who recognise only the factor of force and nothing apart from this. And when the intention is to conclude a treaty of peace with a promise of permanency, the thing that is needful above all else is confidence. An Imperial Chancellor will, however, be unable to find this confidence in his opponents, so long as he adheres to the official German account of the origin of the war,\* so long as he professes to be the conqueror and refuses to express himself on war-aims. By such an attitude he will therefore in fact prevent, not merely the awakening of

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\* Which, moreover, it may be observed in passing, is also in contradiction with the German White Book.

the German people, but also at the same time the conclusion of peace.†

The moral estimate placed upon the Chancellor in foreign countries, indicated in the preceding paragraphs, is moreover a factor of which too little account has unfortunately been taken in Germany. The Reichstag representative Konrad Haussmann wrote in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 14th, 1916, that the capital, which had been quietly amassed in faith in this Chancellor's integrity, could now be seen yielding interest. This is from any point of view a capital error. The Chancellor was regarded by foreign countries as the representative of the system which they mean to combat in Germany, and he could not have inspired universal confidence until he acted *openly*. But as events have shown, this confidence was lacking, not only among his opponents, but also among his own people.

The grounds which induced the Chancellor to assume the attitude which in fact he adopted are, moreover, not difficult to guess. It is clear that he personally, and of course the other leading men in Germany as well, must certainly be in a position to survey the true state of affairs. But it was just for this very reason that he was unwilling to express himself openly. For had he done so, he would also have opened the

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† In No. 1270 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, R. Said-Ruete emphasises that every step so far taken by the Chancellor had produced an effect contrary to what he had desired: "Instead of carefully cultivating feelings of sympathy, which would turn out to be of far greater value for the future than any partial success in arms, and thus re-establishing the gravely shattered confidence in the foreign and home policy of the Government, the Central Powers, owing to a complete absence of psychological understanding of international questions, are confronted with a whole world of antipathies."

eyes of the German people and aroused them from their sleep. They would then have arrived at the recognition of the very things it was meant to keep from them. What the Chancellor thus strove to attain was no doubt peace, but it was a peace without an awakening. And it is easy to understand why this should have been so. For the awakening of the German people might in the sequel have turned even against the Chancellor and his government. It was just because the people had placed so blind a confidence in all the catch-words hitherto issued by the government that the effect of the truth was now dreaded. There is no lack of eloquent evidence to show that this apprehension has in fact existed in authoritative circles in Germany, and that to-day it exists more than ever.

I select only one example. The Pan-German *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten* of May 25th, 1917, reported as follows under the title: "Over-zealous Friends":

"One hears it said that the Chancellor does not believe that the future peace will correspond to the expectations which a large part of the people associate with it. He is said to be anxious lest the disillusionment which will later be felt, combined with the inevitable financial burdens, may provoke profound expressions of dissatisfaction. Above all, it is necessary to protect the throne against the consequences of such discontent. The leading statesman who will be called upon to accept responsibility for the future peace has not sufficient power and authority to achieve this end. For this reason the responsibility for the substance of the peace to be concluded must be laid on broader shoulders. The German people will take the future peace upon itself, if by its duly authorised representa-



tives, by the great parties, it bears its own share of the responsibility. Hence, without wishing to go so far as to adopt a Parliamentary system, it would be desirable that men enjoying the confidence of the great parties should be made jointly responsible, as secretaries of state, for the whole policy of the Empire and at the same time for determining the shape which peace will assume. In this way it will be possible to complete the political and economic reconstruction of Germany after the war, without that grave injury to the crown which otherwise might be apprehended."

It is clear that the Pan-German paper from which I have extracted this passage comments on the view therein expressed in a sense which shows anything but concurrence: "Hindenburg promises us victory; why then need we be troubled by these pessimists who in all these months of war have carried on their mischievous work?" But this comment is a matter of indifference. As evidence of the sentiments prevailing in Germany the above words are quite invaluable. Above all they show distinctly that the awakening has already occurred at any rate in one place in the governing circles of Germany and in their surroundings.\* And with the awakening the morning nausea (*Katzenjammer*) has also already come. They have begun to prepare for the critical hour by looking round for accomplices who will be called upon to share in the drink which they have brewed for themselves; for they are apprehensive of the moment when the German people will present the bill to its Government. And thereupon

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\* This is also indicated in a letter from Harnack mentioned in the *Bayrische Kurier*, in which it is said that Bethmann sees the greatest danger in those people who still believed in a German victory. At the best there could be a draw.

there comes a saving idea—democracy! After all is said, this must surely be good for something—just as Pacifism is. If it is possible to get out of the mire by resorting to these things, well then, sufficient for the day! Time will show what is to come later. Pacifism has already been tried—unfortunately without success. On November 9th, 1916, the Chancellor announced to an astonished world that he was ready to place himself at the head of an international league whose function should be to keep the disturbers of the peace in check. Think of it! In the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of November 18th, 1916, I uttered a warning against this unexpected pacifist transformation in the Chancellor, and advised that its sincerity should first be tested. Subsequent events have justified my scepticism.

After Pacifism came the turn of Democracy. Throughout the whole world democracy was spoken about. What a commotion was made about it! But then came the Russian Revolution and instilled a wholesome horror into the leading men of Germany. They pulled their courage together for the Imperial Easter message. What has that come to? It is possible to read in the German papers that the German Government *itself* sought to put all obstacles in the way of the fulfilment of this message. The Committee appointed on the constitution cautiously went round about any serious democratic advance, like a cat round hot broth, and was in the end prorogued. The fear of the Russian Revolution had been dissipated; it was realised that there was no need to apprehend a revolution from the German people, and Democracy was accordingly sent home again.

In order correctly to explain in their true significance the steps taken by the leading circles of Germany in the direction of a democratisation, and to show how the irony of history prevails in this war, I must here interpolate a few words on the motives which, on their own admissions, determined the actions of the war-makers in Germany before the war. (I may expressly observe that we are not here concerned with mere presumptions or reports taken from the Press or from the utterances of third persons but with matters which are historically certain and which can be proved.) For decades the increase of social democracy had been followed with increasing anxiety in the governing classes of Germany. As the most effective weapon against its increase a war was recommended. By a victorious war it was hoped that the social democrats would be again chained to the Hohenzollern state, that thus at a blow the democratic "danger" would be removed, and that they would once more have unhampered "power" in their own hands. Among all the motives which were decisive for the makers of war, this was in reality the most important, although of course this fact was not trumpeted throughout the world. When this fact is recalled, and when it is further realised that this war has produced exactly the opposite effect to that for which its authors hoped, that throughout the whole world democracy is in truth making the most stupendous progress in consequence of this war, and that in consequence of this a new orientation has to be contemplated even in Germany, then we can indeed only say that there is here an almost unparalleled historical irony—an irony which is so great that it is only ex-

celled by one other, namely by the attitude of the German social democrats round Scheidemann, who render menial services to the Government which is waging a war for the purpose of getting rid of them.

When these facts are recalled, one will naturally be careful not to expect too much even from the measures which are being considered in Germany while I am writing these lines, and will be on one's guard against attaching to these proposals far-reaching hopes of any kind whatsoever. Of its own free will the German Government will assuredly do nothing in the direction of democracy. Democratisation is for them exclusively a weapon which they seek to make subservient to their ends in this their critical hour.\* The utmost that could be asked would be whether a sufficiently strong impulse will come from among the people to provoke a sincere advance. But this also I doubt.† The exces-

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\* According to announcements which are before me, the Crown Council is said to have resolved to open the way on principle for the inclusion of members of Parliament in the conduct of the affairs of the Empire and of the Prussian State. Accordingly, the ingenious prescription of the "friends of the Chancellor" would thus really be carried out. This is now confirmed by the speech of the new Chancellor, according to which men who, in addition to their personal qualifications, also enjoy the full confidence of the great parties in the representative assembly, are to be summoned to fill the leading positions. If only there had sat in the Crown Council at least *one* single man possessed of the courage to tell the German Emperor the truth! In that case much would already have been gained. Who, however, does not recall the meeting of the Supreme War Council in Potsdam in July, 1914? It would be presumptuous to believe that feeling in these circles is now essentially different. It is only fear that in these quarters will impel to other decisions: inner conviction will never do so.

† The reader will perhaps recall the conversation between Prince Bülow and Althoff on the political training of the Germans, in which the latter said: "We are the first people in philosophy, music and lyrical poetry. No one surpasses us in bravery before the enemy. In learning and technical science, in trade and industry, we have made enormous progress. As it is not possible to accomplish and to

sive modesty of the German Reichstag is well known. It never gets transported. In the Zabern affair it pulled itself together for once to pass a vote of no confidence, but it then at once turned right-about-face. And Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg swallowed this vote of no confidence without turning a hair—much less then did he feel that his seat was thereby rendered insecure. The German representatives in the Reichstag are far too good subjects to do anything to the German Government that could really look like democracy.

Nevertheless I shall be glad to have been deceived in this prediction. What, however, affords me a certain justification in being so sceptical in my thoughts even at this stage, is an intimation in No. 1266 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. We read there that it is proposed that a resolution of the whole house should obtain the concurrence of the overwhelming majority, making clear the character of the war of defence forced on Germany, expressly stating that the German people is only waging a war of defence forced upon it, and repudiating every violation of independent na-

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be everything at the same time, your Excellency will not be surprised if in politics we are asses." I will not be so lacking in politeness as to subscribe to this, although I have always had a certain weakness for Althoff, notwithstanding all the shady sides of his character. But this much is certain, that we dare not promise ourselves too much from the initiative of the German citizen to become politically independent and to free himself from the yoke of the militarists and the imperialists. Not until the great awakening comes will it be possible for this to be otherwise. For this reason also very little hope can be placed on the fact that we constantly hear it said of the Germans that they will see to it unaided that their house is put in order. This is just what we may be permitted to doubt. Without pressure or compulsion in one form or another—from within or without, or from both sides—it will never be otherwise in Germany!

tions.\* This announcement plainly proves that even those representatives in the German Reichstag who are striving to secure democratisation are not yet "awake." What they want, indeed, appears to be entirely right. They mean in this resolution to oppose the annexationists. But, as is well known, the first essential to annexation is victory, and so long as this presupposition is absent, the fear of annexations is also entirely superfluous. These Parliamentarians are thus opposing nothing but an illusion, and it is also obvious that they themselves are moving in such an illusion. Moreover, the means which they apply is mistaken, and is so for this reason, that their procedure has at the same time the effect of moving to a remote distance even the

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\* This peace resolution of the majority in the German Reichstag has meanwhile been published. The text, which certainly sounds somewhat more prudent, runs as follows:

"As on August 4th, 1914, the words which occurred in the speech from the throne, 'We are not urged on by lust of conquest,' still hold for the German people on the threshold of the fourth year of the war. Germany seized arms in defence of her freedom and independence, and for the inviolability of her territorial possessions. The Reichstag strives for a peace based on an understanding and a permanent reconciliation among the nations. Compulsory acquisitions of territory, as well as political, economic or financial acts of violence, are incompatible with such a peace. The Reichstag further repudiates all plans which are directed to the economic isolation and the creation of hostility among the nations after the war. The freedom of the seas must be placed on a sure basis. Only an economic peace will prepare the ground for a situation in which the nations will live together in friendship. The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international organisations resting on law. So long, however, as the enemy Governments refuse to enter on such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, so long will the German people stand together to a man, and will immovably hold out and continue the struggle, until the right to life and development of Germany and her allies is assured. In its unity the German people is unconquerable. The Reichstag knows that in this it is at one with the men who are protecting the Fatherland in a heroic struggle. The imperishable thanks of the whole people is assured to them."

possibility of peace negotiations. It is, however, clear that the Allies will never recognise the doctrine of the German war of defence. For them it is obviously by no means a matter of indifference whether Germany is waging a war of aggression or of defence. If it is merely defending itself, the German Government can say: "You have been unable to conquer us, and therefore we are the victors." If however it was the aggressor and cannot master the other side, then the German Government cannot at the same time rightly play the part of victor. The author of the "Germanicus" pamphlet is therefore entirely correct when he describes this as the "salient point." If therefore the "coming democrats" of Germany adhere to this doctrine, peace may yet be a long time in coming. For so much must be clear to every one gifted with insight, that the future Europe and the future of the German people cannot possibly be built on a lie.

As matters stand in Germany, it can in fact scarcely be assumed that in that country it will be possible to arrive so quickly at a real democratisation. The presupposition would be a complete change of system,\* which however would also primarily presuppose a change in the person of the Chancellor. I should like to reproduce here without alteration what I wrote on this latter point, although the Chancellor crisis has meanwhile become a fact: "So long as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is at the head of affairs, the Government will not get beyond half measures, and will con-

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\* It does not require to be stated that the intimation of an equal electoral law for Prussia has nothing to do with a change of system. On this occasion the mountain has once more brought forth the expected mouse.

tinue to humble itself before Militarism and Pan-Germanism, and these are things which a real democracy cannot endure. From opportunistic motives they may perhaps proceed to specious measures such as may appear to be called for, not only by the demands of the parties in the Reichstag, but also by the speech of Lloyd George—who, as is well known, recently declared that he would sooner enter into peace negotiations with a democratic German Government—and also by the Austrian Emperor's desire for peace. But the German Government will be no more in earnest with these indications of progress than it was with the Easter message. They will not be in earnest in Germany until a change of system comes, and such a change will only take place under compulsion. Or is it perhaps the case that such a "compulsion" is already being experienced there? The possibility should not be excluded. But as far as can be foreseen, a sincere change of system will not come in Germany until the German people has been awakened. Meanwhile, among all the reforms, a change in the person of the Chancellor will perhaps produce the best effect. A Chancellor whose appearance was not encumbered by the earlier words and actions of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg would presumably inspire more confidence in foreign countries. Moreover the German people, if ever, needs at the present moment a complete man. And that is what Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has never been. Above all he was no *statesman*. Posterity will neither shed tears on his grave nor weave crowns to his memory. He will stand in history like a feeble reed, at a moment when the German people had need



of an immovable rock.\* With his name will be identified the most baneful chapter in German history."

So I wrote the other week. Since then Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has in fact resigned office and Herr Michaelis has taken his place. This fact leads me here to a further interpolation.

In Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg there has been removed from office the statesman who will one day have to bear before history the responsibility for the present catastrophe. To this extent one might go so far as to describe him as the most pitiable of all mortals. Yet sympathy would indeed in this case be out of place. Weakness in a statesman in the face of such a catastrophe affords no exoneration. Certainly Herr von

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\* Theodor Wolf observes in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 9th, 1917, that unfortunately no one has been able to testify to any excessive manifestation of energy on the part of the Chancellor. "During the war Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has been compelled to settle matters with Pan-German Chauvinism, but he has been much too late in recognising the dangerousness of this widely-spread epidemic. His intention has been to remedy the errors of his predecessors, and after short attempts at betterment he has continued their practices. Constantly yielding ground, he has given away the power that was in his hands bit by bit, until little was left him. There was much that he lamented, yet he took his part in what was going on. . . . Has Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg so far given the German people anything else than words as his contribution to the new orientation of internal conditions? He has given us promises, the fulfilment of which he has postponed—well-sounding sentences about the 'brave fellows,' while in the selection of the personnel of the Government he has continued to follow the most venerable traditions. . . . Should Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg be taken from us, it will be said of him that he was often conscious of the right path, but it was only unfortunate that he frequently followed another." In the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 13th, 1917, Theodor Wolf demands that by his actions Bethmann's successor must at once and in his own person give a guarantee that what Bethmann could not achieve will now be carried through without hesitation and without lukewarmness. His task must in no way be to "fulfil the will of those forces who still desire to subdue the world, and who, unreasoningly and with a deep aversion, are opposed to a fundamental reformation in the Empire."

Bethmann-Hollweg did not belong to the war-intriguers. Personally he did not want war. Yet from the beginning he was so weak in his opposition to the intrigues of the war-makers—it is sufficient to recall the reasons advanced for the Army Bill of 1913—that in the end he himself succumbed to them, and thereby it was he who plunged the German people into this disaster. And after he had once given way to the militarists and the Pan-Germans, although he then recognised where the path must lead, he showed himself so supine that it was precisely the Pan-Germans who became his bitterest enemies.\* Thus this “leader” of German policy in the end became a mere shuttlecock, taking his share in everything that was happening and putting up with anything, no matter how gravely it might be opposed to his personal conviction.† Moreover his

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\* On the occasion of his resignation the *Kreuzzertung* wrote: “A sigh of relief will be felt through the national circles of the country at the thought that there has now been removed from his post the man who, occupying the highest office, has for eight years controlled the destiny of Prussia and Germany with a singular measure of incompetence and maladroitness.” This judgment is one that cannot be contradicted.

† In the *Berliner Tageblatt* of July 14th, 1917, Erich Dombrowski writes that Bethmann had also familiarised himself with the world of democratic ideas, but that his thoughts had not taken concrete form in actions, but at the utmost in speeches. He was content to make small part-payments. The Easter message and the promise of an equal electoral law were the last attempts to appease the mind of democracy. Schmoller had once called him a modern Fabius Cunctator. The saying has been increasingly justified. He was unable to find the path leading to action; he had over-estimated the strength of the forces in opposition, and he had now fallen because his policy of fair promises, of procrastination, and of irresolution had in the end been unable to discover any way of escape. It is not sufficient to have willed the best; in politics it is alone sufficient to have done the best also. And in this respect Bethmann has fallen short in the eyes of the German people.—Compare, further, the article by Prince Alexander zu Hohenlohe in No. 1309 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

weakness in no way becomes more "sympathetic" by reason of the obvious fact that this statesman failed to recognise his own incompetence, and that he therefore regarded himself as under an obligation to cling to office. Thus in the end he no longer dared to speak openly in any direction, and by this very lack of candour he became personally the greatest obstacle to a conclusion of peace. The Allies would never have given this man their confidence any more than his own countrymen were inclined to do—a consideration which is certainly not without significance for the countless multitude who long for peace.\*

Michaelis, my former colleague in Tokio, has now become Bethmann's successor. I doubt whether it is a matter on which I should congratulate him. More important, however, is the other question whether the German people can be congratulated on Michaelis. On this point also I have the gravest doubts. The Press has already emphasised the fact that Michaelis is a Conservative. This in any case is merely a matter of course in a Prussian administrative official. On the other hand he has always been an energetic personality, as he has again recently proved by his activity as a food dictator. The question, however, is whether the utmost energy of an individual, even if he were a genius, will suffice to save the present system

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\* In recent times this fact appears to have been recognised even in Germany. This is proved by the following paragraph in *Germania* of July 12th, 1917: "The opinion of the Committee of the party is to the effect that, by reason of the feeling which prevails, in part, in the party and in other civil circles, the Chancellor is scarcely a fit or proper person to take part in the peace negotiations, especially having regard to the fact that the declaration of war took place during his tenure of office."

in Germany? I believe not, and in the case of Michaelis I am all the less inclined to believe so, inasmuch as the environment from which he springs is scarcely fitted to qualify him for the solution of those tasks which await him. And just as he is by no means the man who will be able to save the ruling system, so he cannot be regarded as the man to raise up the new Germany. That he is scarcely well informed in international politics is a fact that has already been generally pointed out. But even in internal politics a man who is completely ignorant of what democracy really means, and who can therefore form merely a theoretical conception of all the reforms which he is called upon to carry through, can scarcely be qualified to lead the German people to freedom. His first speech in the Reichstag, the text of which has just reached me, proves that my doubts whether he is the right man to save Germany and to bring peace to the world were in fact completely justified.

If I were to speak quite candidly, I should be constrained to say that I doubt whether the man who is destined to found a free Germany is yet born. It is indeed the great misfortune of the German people that in these heavy hours of destiny they have lacked, and still lack, a leader. From what quarter should such a man arise? Can he by any chance be looked for among the German democrats? Would His Excellency von Payer, the leader of the former South German "Volkspartei," be fitted for the task? Ambition to play the part of the accomplished statesman, and in this way to be agreeable to the Powers above, has long since stifled the democrat in him. Or perhaps

Herr Scheidemann, the menial of Herr von Bethmann, is the man? The German majority socialists are to-day just as unfitted for this task as any of the civil parties. And as German bureaucracy appears in no way adapted to bring forth a creator of a new and a free Germany, so also unfortunately are the German political parties.

Thus, unfortunately, one cannot in fact but be apprehensive that the true leaders of Germany are not yet to be found. They will no doubt fail to appear until the coming awakening of the German people. And it is to be hoped that when that comes, the modern type of politician and statesman will find entrance in Germany also, the man who is at once a good patriot and also a man of the world, the man who is able to combine love of his country with cosmopolitanism, refinement of mind with democratic conviction. Where is this type to be found in Germany to-day? In the case of Prince Alexander zu Hohenlohe we see how his countrymen act towards the representatives of this type. To-day the German people is not yet ripe enough to recognise the qualities which its leaders will one day require—because, in fact, it has not yet awakened.

So much I have thought it desirable to interpolate at this stage because of the events of last week.

For the rest, we can only emphasise once more that a change in person is of course in itself in no way a change of system. And of this latter the German people is also urgently in need. May it, therefore, awake as speedily as possible to a real democracy! When it has recognised the truth, may it, in taking its destiny into its own hands, finally shake off the

domination of the military caste and of Pan-Germanism. And even if this change in the system of government should in appearance be accomplished in Germany without a revolution, may it nevertheless at least bring with it a revolution in spirit, so that the German people in awakening will also have gained a moral victory over itself, and will not shrink from an acknowledgment of its own guilt. Such a moral victory would count for infinitely more than all military victories taken together.\* May it be possible in Germany to rise to the recognition of this important fact. That is the desire of all the *true* friends of the German people. Many who are to-day alienated from them are assuredly waiting for nothing else than for this awakening, in order once more to press their hand in the old sympathy.

I believe that in the preceding pages I have sufficiently explained how much depends on this awakening, not merely for the German people but also for the rest of the world. For to all of us it will bring nothing less than peace! And consequently those of us who are neutrals are entirely justified in our desire that

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\* Is it the case then that a German victory would really have been a stroke of good fortune for the German people? In that case would not a definite supremacy have been acquired by those classes which, in 1914, had already gained the upper hand, and which I have described above as the real enemies of the German people? Would we not, in that case, have had as a permanent institution a Europe bristling with arms, quite apart from the moral and other consequences? And in that case, to speak the language of German historians, would not this war have been followed by other "Punic Wars"? Human nature being what it is, it is easy to understand that this admission will stick in the throat of a good German patriot. And yet they will have to work their way to the recognition of this fact, and, indeed, the sooner the better! May the German people speedily recognise the path to its true happiness!

the efforts to remove the obstacles, which so far have stood in the way of this awakening, may be attended with success. When the peace of Europe is at stake, there must be no dilatoriness. The nations have a right to demand the truth from their Governments; they have a right to demand that if there is a path to peace, this path must be followed, and that the obstacles in the way must be removed. And therefore they are entitled to demand, and we neutrals have the right to associate ourselves with them in their demand: *Away with the official accounts and fictions, which stand in the way of peace negotiations!*

But it is not merely the conclusion of peace, but also what is to come afterwards, that depends on a change in the present day German mentality, on an awakening of the German people from the suggestions of the war-makers. We cannot but hope that after the war it will be possible for the nations to re-enter into economic and spiritual intercourse with each other, that they will be able to resume the old relationships, that hatred will come to an end, and that the incitement of the nations against each other will cease, and that in place of this the nations will once more seek to establish relations of mutual understanding. In other words it should be possible for peace to be followed by international understanding. But such a consummation also is possible only if the German mentality has first of all been altered. I believe that I may venture to say this without fear of being misunderstood. For before the war I was one of the leaders of the movement which sought to work for an understanding between Germany on the one hand and France

and England on the other; I have for years endeavoured to oppose the Pan-German chauvinistic tendency and to create a counterpoise to it in the organisation which I founded. And in *Wissen und Leben* of August 15th, 1916, I have further expressly emphasised the fact that my friends and I hope to be able to continue our work after this war. But as things now are, we must not mistake the difficulties in the way of such a task. It is first of all necessary to measure the gulf of hatred, distrust and antipathy, before it is possible to think of overbridging it. It avails nothing to raise a hollow building. Just as I should in no way have considered that a premature conclusion of peace in this war would have been in the interests of the future of Europe, so I should not be inclined to press for an understanding between men and nations who distrust and hate each other, until I had sought to recognise and remove the reason of this distrust.

And it is for this reason that I can only repeat once more: The possibility of a future understanding between the nations, like the possibility of an enduring peace, depends—*on the awakening of the German people!*



## II

**I**N the foregoing pages I have been concerned with such factors as are operative in Germany itself in the direction of impeding the awakening of the German people. It is however self-evident that these factors are to be sought not merely in Germany but also in neutral foreign countries.

If the neutral peoples kept themselves immune against the various forms assumed by the psychosis of war in the belligerent countries, and their manifestation in the form of the manufacture of opinion among the neutrals, such a result might have been, in so grave a time, profitable to the German people. If this result were not realised, an effect directly contrary might supervene.

Among the neutrals there was, however, scarcely any other land so adapted for the purpose of exercising an influence on German feeling and thought in one direction or another as just our own country of Switzerland, inasmuch as it is not merely situated in immediate proximity to the German Empire, but also stands in a completely natural manner in close spiritual contact with our neighbouring state, as a result of the linguistic and cultural kinship of a section of its population. We may therefore very properly ask what has been the attitude adopted by our Swiss population towards the intellectual outlook of the German people indicated above.

*A priori* one might well have assumed that neutral foreign countries, and more particularly Switzerland, would have kept themselves immune against the German manufacture of opinion, that they would recognise that in a country which is at war it is necessary to engender in the population the necessary sentiment and passion for war as well as the necessary spirit of sacrifice, but that the neutral as a matter of course is not called upon to accept at its face value all that reaches us from the other side of the frontiers in the shape of news of attempts to exercise influence under the guise of the "struggle for the soul of the neutrals." Such an immunity on our part could in fact scarcely have failed to produce a certain impression on the German people, and would have been, it may be thought, of material assistance in bringing this nation, misled by a prolonged process of manipulation, more quickly to a recognition of the true state of affairs. And this again might perhaps have shortened the war and might perhaps have spared the nations much agony.

Is it the case then that this intellectual immunity has existed in our case? There is no one who will seriously venture to assert that it has! I believe I am justified in bluntly making this assertion. In our case the population has not remained immune! What, however, is the cause of this? The explanation of this fact is certainly not devoid of general interest, and I should therefore like to devote a few lines to the subject.

In order to make it easier to understand the genesis of the state of mind in Switzerland to-day on the sub-

ject of the present war, I propose in the first place to offer a few observations with reference to the period before the war. In doing so, I can of course only select examples; and for this purpose I choose that department which calls for most consideration in connection with the formation of a public opinion—I refer to the Press.

It is long since the careful observer must have been struck by the way in which our German-Swiss Press is provided with news from Germany. The correspondents of the German-Swiss papers, the *Bund*, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and all the other papers that here call for consideration, were not accustomed to look at things in the Empire through the spectacles of the democrat, as would have been the only appropriate viewpoint having regard to our conditions.

On the contrary the Swiss Press was for the most part served by correspondents who occupied the National-Liberal point of view, which forty years ago was certainly a very admirable thing, but to-day is more or less identical with Pan-Germanism. In these correspondents it was impossible to find a trace of any understanding of our Swiss political conceptions, just as they appeared to be entirely ignorant of the fact that there were even in Germany a few democrats, or at any rate men who wanted to become so. All political questions were disposed of with the superficiality which unfortunately is customary in German National-Liberal circles to-day, without any criticism directed upwards and without any suggestion of adaptation to our Swiss views on these matters.

In the years preceding the war I have often, in con-

versation with Theodor Curti, given expression to my anxiety as to the effects of this attitude on the part of the Press, which threw a by no means favourable light on our Swiss Press. Was it not observed amongst us that in this way our Swiss public received an extremely one-sided picture of the political conditions in the German Empire: a picture which could not fail in the end to produce an unfavourable effect on our own domestic relations? When these correspondents sent their reports to Swiss papers, did they in no way feel that they were bound in some measure to take into consideration Swiss views and conditions, and that moreover the nascent democracy in Germany were entitled to claim that some interest should be shown in them, when they turned to the Swiss Press? But of all this there was no suggestion! German liberalism on the left was disposed of with a shrug of the shoulders, or else the attempt was made to ridicule it. And in place of what might have been expected, with a thoughtlessness that could scarcely be surpassed, the Swiss public were regaled with the most barren platitudes of German political thought, such as might have been entirely to the taste of an uncorrupted German National-Liberal stomach (the accent being of course on the word *National*) for digestion over a glass of beer. One could not, however, fail to be surprised at the stomach of the Swiss reading public, which could digest such unaccustomed fare. But indeed the stomach of this public had gradually become habituated even to such a diet as this.

It is clear that in our Press there was neither anxiety felt, nor headaches occasioned, by reflecting on the

pernicious effects of such a procedure. If one discussed these matters with a Swiss editor, it was explained that they were merely giving "pictures of feelings," and with this the matter was ended. Now the cinematograph, when all is said, also gives "pictures of feelings," and nevertheless the effect it produces may be very different according as it is made subservient merely to sensationalism or to a higher end. A Press, conscious of its mission, will not in fact be content to reproduce "pictures of feelings," but it will also inquire as to their effects; it will also desire to exercise an educational influence and, so far as politics comes in question, it will place itself in the service of the ideas of the Fatherland, that is to say, in our case, it will further democratic thought. So far as correspondence received from Germany is concerned, this duty was neglected by our German-Swiss Press before the war. And that this duty is still neglected is a fact of which anyone may obtain daily conviction by a glance at our Press. For example, let anyone read, if for once only, the gossip—I can find no expression more apt—of certain South German or Berlin correspondents of our most widely read newspapers. It is necessary, no doubt, to add that the way in which these papers are served from Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, etc., is not a whit better. In these countries also there would appear to be a very large number of German National-Liberals.

It is by no means superfluous to recall these matters, for they were a clear symptom—perhaps the clearest in the period before the war—of a phenomenon which was first made manifest among us in its full

scope on the outbreak of war, viz., the astonishing intellectual dependence on the new political spirit of Germany into which we had recently fallen, a dependence the effect of which was that the democratic idea was becoming less and less appreciated amongst us, and that, unconsciously and unobserved so far as we ourselves were concerned, we were becoming more and more infiltrated with imperialistic and other trains of thought, which were alien to our true character and which we would have cast far from us, had they openly and suddenly approached us. But it is quite possible, by way of a gradual infiltration through the Press, to influence in certain directions the manner of thought of a people. This intellectual process of development was now at a stroke revealed to us by the war, and for this at least the war deserves our gratitude.

In what way, then, has this dependence shown itself? It has done so in the fact which I have already confirmed above, in the lamentable lack of resisting power shown by our Swiss public towards the German manufacture of war-feeling. For this also, when all is said, there is no doubt one ground of excuse, and this I should like to anticipate at once at the outset. This is the "perfection of the German organisation" which, as in other spheres, has made itself felt in connection with the provision of the news of foreign countries.\* Everything that the Germans do, they do thoroughly; once having begun the war with a legend, they were compelled to carry it through consistently, and this

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\* Compare on this subject the interesting review of Dr. Schoop in the *Neue Helvetische Gesellschaft* (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, No. 1170, of June 27th, 1917).

also was provided for with a thoroughness which in fact left nothing to be desired. In consequence mitigating circumstances might be allowed to our Swiss public, or at least to that part which has less political education, if in the end it no longer knew what it should and should not believe. In any case these mitigating circumstances are in no way applicable to our Press, which as the leader of public opinion has here entirely failed in its duty.†

When all that we have had to submit to in these three years in the way of intellectual influence from foreign countries is recalled, it is necessary to go further and say that clearly it cannot be sufficient to admit in ourselves this absence of immunity, but that in the interests of our intellectual independence we must take counter-measures against this kind of intellectual infiltration. And for this, one thing above all else is essential. We must once again gradually recover the power of talking straightly, and must learn to discuss matters together, showing what is in our hearts. This is primarily to be desired in the interests of our Swiss unity and of the reconciliation between German and Welsch. In addition to this, however, it is in the interests of peace. For there is only one thing that can bring to the world a speedy peace and that is the recognition and the acknowledgment of the truth. And therefore, for the sake of this great cause, I should here like to express myself openly, even at the risk that many may wish to stone me for it.

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† Schoop also emphasises the denial of the democratic-republican principles on which our political existence rests, and the failure of the Press to recognise our most vital interests.

Thus then: It is high time that we in German Switzerland should make an end of that Phariseeism which strikes the breast and says, "I am not as my Welsch brother." For in this war—I say the momentous word calmly\*—it is not German, but Welsch, Switzerland that has represented the Swiss conscience. I hear the storm raging against me, but what I have asserted I will also prove.†

As a matter of course I disregard the excesses and aberrations, such as have taken place on both sides, which naturally I do not approve on either side. Although nevertheless there would still remain the question which of these excesses has been the more dangerous for our country and for our national spirit. There were certain street demonstrations which were indeed anything but beautiful, but they did not extend upwards and chiefly concerned the mob. Those highly placed persons who have been to a greater or less degree unmasked—not merely persons of high military rank but also civilians—were for the most part to be looked for on the other side. Further the list of writers, who have frequently proclaimed somewhat peculiar views for our Swiss conditions and also in part for our neutrality, is unfortunately on the German-Swiss side a very long one. I merely enumerate at random a few names; alongside the authors of *Stimmen im Sturm* there are Messrs. Bolliger, Bächtold, Ruchti, Wernle, Schaffner, Mühlestein, Gertsch, etc. I am therefore of the opinion that even with

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[\* "Du sprichst ein grosses Wort gelassen aus"—Goethe.]

† Compare on this subject what Fleiner writes in No. 1226 of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on "The Lessons of the Crisis."



regard to what has been manifested by those classes who are *above* the average, people in German Switzerland have no reason to be proud of themselves, compared with Welsch Switzerland, but that they should rather put their own house in order.

I come now to a point which is of greater importance, and that is the normal, the average feeling in German and Welsch Switzerland, so far as it has made itself public. And on this I should like to make the following observations. In Welsch Switzerland, where the true situation was much more quickly recognised and where the population remained immune against the German manufacture of opinion, the judgments which I have encountered, notwithstanding all the sympathies that were manifested, were nevertheless of an entirely patriotic nature. Anxiety for our confederate ideals, the thought of right, democracy and freedom which unites the whole Swiss population, these were there the predominant element. And at the same time anxiety was expressed lest sufficient value was no longer attached in German-Switzerland to these Swiss ideals, and lest our Swiss commonwealth was thereby imperilled. I can only summarise my impression by saying that in the case of the Welsch Swiss it is good "confederate" motives that have been the determining factor, and that therefore they did in fact represent the conscience of Switzerland, when they intervened on behalf of our Swiss ideals. The fact that they desired to enter their protest when international law was violated might perhaps appear to many to be imprudent; but when all is said such a course was not merely an absolute right of the people, who, after all,

are not the Government, but it once more proved how dear our ideals were to their hearts.\*

Whereas there was thus in Welsch Switzerland a constant appeal to our Swiss ideals, one cannot but observe that in the case of German Switzerland on the other hand there was really very little mention made of these matters. And when the conversation turned on the war and questions connected with this subject, it was impossible not to make the surprising discovery, even in the case of the intellectual classes, that the opinions which were heard expressed did in fact reveal very little, if anything at all, of the Swiss standpoint; on the contrary they were for the most part drawn from the Imperial German store of arguments. The German manufacture of opinion, which as I have already mentioned is so excellently organised, has operated so extensively and so comprehensively in the case of many of the German-Swiss that all the stale phrases which I already denounced *before* the war in my *German Chauvinism* are now dished up to them as brand-new examples of sagacity. There is in most cases no trace of an independent judgment of things. Instead of this, an appeal was most frequently made to the kinship in language and culture and to the "sympathies" resulting therefrom, and further, they cited evidence of a very far-reaching state of dependence by reference to the daily paper, on whose qualifications for this purpose I have already expressed myself above. To this there was also added the environment, and

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\* That neutrality neither can nor shall prevent us from intervening on behalf of right and truth is a fact which at the time I put forward in my lecture on "Neutral Duties and National Tasks" which I delivered in 1915 to the Zurich "Freistudentenschaft."

the suggestion of the environment! What these amount to, even in the case of persons of high education, most people completely fail to realise.

The result of all this was that the catchwords imposed by Germany evoked a very sustained echo in the widest circles of German Switzerland, so sustained that many of these German-Swiss were frequently more German in their thoughts, feelings and speech than even the Germans of the Empire. On the subject of France, England, etc., these Swiss appropriated without much reflection all the arguments which had for years been suggested to them from the side of Germany, so that Germans of the Empire who had remained immune said to me: "These German-Swiss have been much more seriously infected by the campaign of lies than real Germans inside the German Empire." There are in fact grounds for apprehension that it will only be with the utmost difficulty that many German-Swiss will free themselves once more from the spell of German catchwords. And yet, notwithstanding this, these same people who follow entirely in the track of the Wolff Bureau are prepared to jeer at the Welsch Swiss! And they even seek forthwith to describe everyone who maintains his immunity from the suggestions of this Bureau—quite after the manner of the Bureau itself—as "friendly to the Entente"—these very men who are themselves the victims of foreign catchwords, and who are therefore far removed from real neutrality. If that is not Phariseeism, what is!

At this point, however, I must pause for a moment. The fact that I have apparently spoken in general

terms of German-Swiss might occasion a misunderstanding. Fortunately it is not by any means the case that all German-Swiss think in this way. No, this is certainly not the case. If I had not known this long ago, it would have been brought to my knowledge in connection with my article in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on "Swiss Policy and the Conclusion of Peace." For after the publication of this article I received from all parts of German Switzerland enthusiastic expressions of concurrence which prove to me that, despite all the war psychosis that rages even in our midst, the infiltration has not advanced so far as might perhaps have been assumed from the manifestations of what is commonly called "public opinion." Indeed I am disposed to agree with E. Bovet, who writes in *Wissen und Leben* of July 1st, 1917, that he in no way believes in the reality of the "majority" in this so-called public opinion in Switzerland. In fact we must not judge the German-Swiss people according to the German-Swiss Press; this would be to do it a grievous wrong. So also it must not be judged according to the political Philistines and Pharisees who swear by their paper, their environment and their party. No, alongside this German-Swiss spirit which widely manifests itself in public, there is another which still firmly cleaves to the old ideals, and will have nothing to do with the German manufacture of opinion.

It is, however, this latter Swiss spirit on which the union between German and Welsch Switzerland rests to-day; this alone is what is really holding our commonwealth together in the present grave hour. The question to-day is to gather together those Swiss who

unfortunately are not in touch with each other since they have no Press at their disposal. For it will be these men who will be called upon after the war to rebuild Swiss unity. It is on them that the future hopes of the Swiss people rest, and not on people like the members of the "German-Swiss Society" who to-day make it their sorry pleasure to incite of set purpose the German and the Welsch elements against each other.

I must here add a further word on the *rôle* which "neutrality" plays in the case of those German-Swiss whom I have just described as infected by German influence. These people can be heard saying: "We do not move a hand either in favour of one belligerent party or of the other." In saying this they regard themselves as models of neutrality. But is it the case then that this is real neutrality? If in civil life one man were to make a cowardly attack on another, I should not place the man attacked on the same footing as the aggressor. This would indeed be contrary to all justice! The neutrality of the individual must never be allowed to go so far as to stifle his feeling of justice. What these people call neutrality is in reality not neutrality at all; it is merely ease and opportunism. They decline to investigate the question thoroughly, and prefer to rely on their daily paper and the talk of the smoking room. Even now there exists a whole series of works which give a fairly exhaustive account of the situation for those who do not yet know it, and who really desire to learn about it, and on a close study of the subject these men might finally be brought into conflict with their "sympathies"! That a neutrality of such a nature can in its essence be equiv-

alent in the end only to an encouragement to one party, is a fact which clearly is not taken into account by these people. Their neutrality is in reality no neutrality at all, quite apart from the fact that it has nothing to do with neutral policy.

What would the lamented Christian Wolf, indisputably one of the greatest authorities of all times on international law, have said to this kind of "moral neutrality"? In 1749 he taught that it was the duty of every State to assist any other State waging a just war, while none ought to help a State whose war is unjust. My Austrian colleague in international law, Lammasch, observes on this point that this would really be the view of the rights and duties of neutrality most completely in consonance with ethical teaching. This sentence should indeed be written in the book of remembrance of all the pseudo-neutrals just described, although the present view of neutrality is of course different. All honour to neutrality! It is the supreme governing principle of our policy and must remain so. But it must not be pursued in such a way that abuses result, and in particular the so-called moral neutrality must not be made a pretext to stifle the feeling for right and truth among the citizens.

And now as regards "sympathies"! Many of our genuine democrats have considered it expedient and necessary to go through thick and thin, in season and out of season, with the German Government, the German Army Command, Wolff's Bureau and the authorities affiliated to these, and to express their sympathies with *these*—not, if you please, with the German people! Can this really be called sympathy? If one seeks

to confirm a deluded people in its errors, is it not rather a case of blind undiscerning partiality? True sympathy—with the German people, be it understood, not with its governing circles with whom we are not called upon to feel ourselves united in kinship either by language, culture or in any other respect—would have sought expression in pointing out to the German people the mistakes and the errors committed on their side, and in warning them against treading such a slippery slope. That would have been true friendship and true sympathy, that would have been a worthy *rôle* for the Swiss people to play in the face of the present catastrophe which threatens to overwhelm the German people. But as things stand, we have in reality in no way advantaged this people with our sympathy, but on the contrary we have rather injured them.

How different would have been the part we would have played, had we remained immune against the official German manufacture of opinion! In full consciousness of our Swiss ideals of freedom and democracy, of right and truth, we could have intervened to prevent the brave German people falling a victim to the delusions of Imperialism and Militarism. We would have sought to contribute to its liberation from the spell under which it exists as a result of the prolonged suggestions of the war-makers. And who knows whether in doing so we would not have made a more permanent contribution to peace than those people who have now for almost three years been seeking to restore peace, relying on ineffective weapons and arguments? Perhaps peace would have been attained long ago, for essentially it depends only on the

awakening of the German people, and the longer this is delayed the worse will it be.

Yes, indeed, had we but comprehended our part, we should not have strengthened the German people in its delusion; we should have sought to enlighten it. We should have sought to reveal the truth instead of co-operating in its suppression from motives of false sympathy. We should have brought home to the German people the realisation of the fact that their true enemy sits in their own country, instead of ourselves joining in the incitement against the French and the English. And we should also have had the courage to tell the German people that from the present school of suffering the new Germany must be born, a Germany that will be able to live with other nations without bristling in steel, a free Germany that has risen above Imperialism and Militarism. All this we would have been able to say to the German people, had we ourselves remained immune and had we comprehended our part!

As it is, however, we have been wanting both in courage and in the capacity to point out to the German people the path to peace and to reconciliation. We have been compelled to renounce the prospect of showing this friendly service to the German people, and thereby to ourselves and to the whole world as well. For—*we ourselves must first awake!* We must first of all again free ourselves from the effects which the psychosis of war has wrought even in our midst, and we must ourselves discover anew the path back to our ideals, before we are in a position to teach others these ideals. Indeed we have in truth every reason to be-



gin by putting our own house in order. For unfortunately we also are not free from the forces and the influences from which the German people must liberate itself. In our case also a process of purification is necessary—a purification which however would simultaneously produce our unity. We must free ourselves from the spell of foreign catchwords, in order in this way to regain the ground on which German and Welsch will be able to stand together in full confidence. This ground is the ground of law, the ground of freedom, the ground pointed out to us by our history. When we know that this ground is once more firmly under our feet, the confidence which to-day is lacking—on this point let there be no illusions in German Switzerland—will completely and entirely return.

The experiences of recent times are perhaps more calculated than anything else to enable us to recover this ground. And when we have first of all regained this basis for our *internal* understanding, then, when the war is ended, we shall again appear competent to do justice to our *international* mission, as a factor making for peace and understanding. On our internal union—after the nations are awake—there will then be built up the external union, *the new Europe*.









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